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The Competing Visions of Fairness: The Basic Choice
for International Criminal Tribunals
Mirjan Damagkaf
I.
International criminal tribunals find themselves in a rather
unenviable position. Their major task is to put an end to the
impunity of individuals who are most responsible for horrendous
crimes that threaten the well-being of the international
community.' Producing convictions is thus high on their list of
priorities. Incongruously, however, they lack indigenous
enforcement powers, depending totally on outside help-primarily
of states-for such basic requirements as securing custody of
defendants, or obtaining evidence. But since crimes within their
jurisdiction are often committed through political structures,
support for their operation is not always forthcoming:
governments can be hostile to their activity. Moreover, even if the
needed cooperation is assured, trying international crimes remains
a very difficult enterprise: the complexity of problems involved in
processing them has few parallels with the prosecution of ordinary
crimes by national criminal courts. Mass victimization and
systemic perpetration that characterize international criminality are
only part of the reason. Another is that international criminal
tribunals aspire to achieve goals that exceed or complicate those of
national criminal law enforcement, such as their ambition to
establish a broader historical record of crime-producing events, or
to contribute to peace and security.2
Despite all the difficulties inherent in bringing culprits to
justice, international criminal tribunals profess their devotion to
fair procedure and declare their readiness to abide by its exacting
t Sterling Professor Emeritus and Professorial Lecturer in Law, Yale Law School.
1 See The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.183/10, pmbl [hereinafter Rome Statute].
2 For the cornucopia of goals set for the International Criminal Tribunal for former
Yugoslavia, see Minna Schrag, Lessons Learned from the ICTY Experience, 2 J. INT'L
CRIM. JUST. 427, 428 (2004).
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standards. Is it not likely, however, that the heavy burden of their
demanding tasks-coupled with their frustrating indigenous
weakness-places these standards under greater stress than is the
case in the environment of domestic criminal prosecutions?
Imagine the prosecution of a high governmental official for an
egregious international crime which has produced mass
victimization: several thousands of crime victims clamor for
justice and expect to receive satisfaction from the accused
official's conviction. But his government refuses to cooperate
with the tribunal and is unwilling to surrender some incriminating
documents. Fearing for his life, a credible prosecution witness
refuses to testify unless permitted to do so anonymously.
Some reliable items of incriminating evidence have been
obtained during an improperly executed premises search, or by an
electronic intercept whose manner of acquisition cannot be
revealed because of promises given to the government whose
secret service obtained the information. Although the untainted
evidence available in the case is strong enough to make the
defendant's guilt quite likely, it fails to meet the standard of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. Does this far from fanciful scenario
not suggest that it is harder for international than for domestic
criminal judges to reject anonymous testimony, or to exclude the
fruits of technically illegal searches? Does it not suggest that
international judges might be more tempted than their national
counterparts to depart sub silentio from the postulated standard of
proof sufficiency? Generally speaking, could the rigid observance
of fair procedure not compromise the ability of international
criminal tribunals to put an end to the impunity of prominent
human rights violators?
The pages that follow are devoted to reflections on this
sensitive issue that is often shrouded in a fog of vaporous pieties.
II.
In order to set the stage for considering the situation in
international criminal courts, we must first glance at the ethical-
legal principle of fairness in national legal systems where it first
appeared. The idea of fairness is usually associated with English
legal and political developments, and traced back to the thirteenth
century Magna Carta. It would be wrong to believe, however, that
the thought of compromising crime control for the sake of other
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values-including the defendant's dignity-was entirely absent
even from the continental procedure of the ancien rigime, despite
its residence in the doghouse of legal history. 3 Yet despite
sporadic and largely ineffective measures prompted by what we
might classify as humanistic values, it was only in the liberal
ideological climate of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
that legal provisions appeared capable of seriously complicating
the realization of governmental punitive impulses. In America,
such provisions were interpreted as concretizations of the
constitutionally enshrined due process idea, and in England were
seen mainly as manifestations of "natural justice." Continental
Europe, on the other hand, lacked an organizing principle of this
scope until the mid-twentieth century, when, under the influence
of the Anglo-American legal vernacular, the principle of fair
procedure made its appearance in the law. The principle rapidly
established itself in legal discourse and court practice.'
Although the demands of fairness were originally conceived
solely as protection of the defendant against abuses of
governmental power, a measure of uncertainty about the reach of
3 Rudiments of due process concerns in this procedure were thought to be required
by natural law. On the important citatio-defensio demands of natural law, see G. Gorla,
lura Naturalia sunt Immutabilia, in DIRITrO E POTERE NELLA STORIA EUROPEA: ATT IN
ONORE DI BRUNO PARADISI 629, 639 (Leo S. Olschki ed., 1982). Rudiments of these
concerns can be found even among its rules on the permissible use of coercive measures
to extract evidence from defendants. For example, one of the greatest authorities of the
inquisitorial process in the seventeenth century, the German Benedict Carpzov, insisted
that the defendant's dignity (dignitas rei) is an important reason for the exemption from
torture. See BENEDICT CARPZOV, PRACTICA NOVA IMPERIALIS SAXONICA RERUM
CRIMINALIUM, pars III, qu. 118, no. 65 (Wurst, Frankofurti 1677). Similar concerns were
expressed as early as the thirteenth century. For Spain, see the Siete Partidas of Alfonso
X of Castile and Leon, Partida VII, titulo 30, ley 2, in 1 CODiGos ANTIGUOS DE ESPAS1 A
(Marcelo Martinez Alcubilla ed., Madrid Administraci6n 1885). Of course, dignity was
not a universal human attribute. It was believed to be limited to persons of high social
standing, so that only very small steps were taken on men's fitful ascent out of the
subhuman.
4 Instrumental in its rapid spread and acceptance was Article 6 of the 1950
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, and the interpretation of this
Article in the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights. Scholarly interest in
the principle is also a relative newcomer on the Continent. In Germany, for instance, the
first monograph dealing with fair procedure appeared only in 1981. See the references in
DOROTHEA RZEPKA, ZuR FAIRNESS IN DEUTSCHEN STRAFVERFAHREN 244 (2000). The
French literature on the "procks 6quitable" is also of relatively recent vintage. See, e.g.,
the literature cited in LoIc CADIET ET AL., TitEORIE GtNtRALE DU PROCES 93-96 (2010).
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its demands was introduced by the more recent rise of the victims'
rights movement. In its wake, some authorities took the position
that not only the defendant but also victims and witnesses-
perhaps even the prosecutor---can raise fairness claims.' This
position implied, of course, that the resolution of fairness issues
requires balancing the defendant's interests against those of other
procedural participants. But even where this position on the scope
of the principle prevailed, his interests were accorded the greatest
weight in the resulting "mediating discourse": the rights of victims
were not treated as equally strong, capable of generating equally
strong demands. It may thus safely be said that in national justice
systems, procedural fairness in criminal procedure tends to be
understood first and foremost as fairness toward the defendant.
This is easy to understand, considering how hard it would be
for these systems to abandon their special concern for the
defendant's interests-a pro-defendant bias. It is most clearly
reflected in the many entailments of the presumption of innocence,
especially in the generally accepted maxim that it is better to
acquit a large number of guilty people than to convict a single
innocent. Even if evidence points to a high probability of a
defendant's guilt but fails to prove it beyond a reasonable doubt,
he is entitled to an outright acquittal.6 Inevitably, then, acquittals
cover a large epistemic terrain, stretching from ascertained
innocence to a great likelihood of guilt. The systematic tilt in
defendant's favor can also be detected in the treatment of reliable
but illegally obtained evidence. If incriminating in nature, it tends
to be rejected (even if necessary to a successful prosecution); if
exculpatory, it tends to be admitted. But the fact that the ghost of
the innocent man convicted hovers over criminal justice is not the
only reason for favoring the criminal defendant. Consider, for
example, that the defendant is permitted to withdraw from the
interrogation process, although he happens to be a precious
informational source. Desirous to protect his autonomy and
privacy, the justice systems accord him the right to remain silent,
and even prohibit the fact-finders from drawing unfavorable
inferences from his exercise of the right. Because continental
5 See infra note 19.
6 See Mirjan R. Damaika, Truth in Adjudication, 49 HASTINGS L. J. 289, 305
(1998).
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European countries do not let him testify under oath as a witness,
and refuse to criminalize his detected false testimony, some
commentators go so far as to maintain that he has the right to lie.'
Remember also that he has the right to confront witnesses, even if
confrontation might expose witnesses to a more serious danger
than the danger the defendant faces in the event of conviction.
The approach whose bias of interest focuses on him survives even
the finality of judgments. Thus, if new evidence comes to light
justifying the reopening of a case, it may be used if it is
exculpatory in nature, but seldom, if ever, when it is incriminating.
Many more examples of such favores defensionis could easily be
given.
Now, it is a banal observation that a tension exists between the
criminal justice system's bias in favor of the defendant and its
desire to repress crime and punish criminals. Other things
remaining equal, the greater the emphasis placed on the need to
repress crime, the more rules favoring the defendant are seen as
obstacles frustrating the realization of justice.' Conversely, the
more the impulse to punish the guilty weakens, the easier it
becomes for the operators of the justice system to observe rules
aimed at safeguarding the defendant's interests. What, we should
then ask, can be said about the punitive impulse of contemporary
national justice systems in the West? In regard to more recent
responses to terrorism and organized crime, the punitive impulse is
strong, justifying liberal concerns that its intensity generates
tensions with rules favoring the defendant. But in the area of
ordinary crime-the staple of national criminal law enforcement-
symptoms of a weakening libido puniendi can be discerned.' The
accuracy of factual determinations is no longer a high priority,
although accuracy is necessary to determine the punitive response
postulated by substantive law. Outcomes agreed to by officials
7 See MIRJAN R. DAMA KA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY 130
(1968). In continental legal systems, this right is sometimes thought to be a constitutive
part of procedural fairness. See, e.g., Mohammed Ayat, Le silence prend la parole: la
percie du droit de se taire en droit international penal, Revue de Droit International et
de Droit Compar6 237 (2001) (Belg.). See also RZEPKA, supra note 4, at 394.
8 Herbert Packer has famously likened his Due Process model to an "obstacle
course." HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF CRIMINAL SANCTION 163 (1968).
9 They might persist, barring contamination by attitudes formed in the wars on
organized crime and terrorism.
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and defendants proliferate, criminal punishment can be "bargained
down" and even replaced by non-criminal sanctions and measures.
At least on the European continent, this development is reflected
in legal scholarship. The quest for "substantive truth"-until
recently extolled as the most important organizing principle of
criminal procedure-is downgraded in importance, and its high
place is increasingly accorded to "fairness" whose central concern
is solicitude toward the interests of the defendant. 'o As
philosophers would say, procedural justice is gaining at the
expense of its substantive antipode. The road to the destination
seems to be becoming more important than the increasingly
uncertain destination itself.
III.
What we have just said provides an easy access to the first of
several reasons why the demands of fairness come under greater
stresses and strains in international criminal tribunals than in
national criminal courts. Since the jurisdiction of the former is
reserved for some of the most horrendous crimes imaginable, and
since these tribunals are specifically charged with ending the
impunity of the most responsible perpetrators of these crimes, it
seems inevitable that the perceived need of international tribunals
to obtain conviction exceeds that of their national counterparts in
cases that typically come before them. And since international
tribunals face far greater difficulties than national courts in
securing custody of defendants and obtaining evidence they need,
it is also quite natural that some domestically developed standards
of fair procedure should be experienced in the international
context as unusually high and frustrating barriers to conviction.
If these domestic standards are experienced as obstructing, this
does not mean, of course, that international judges will disregard
them. It would be wrong-even insolent-to assume that they
react to barriers to conviction in the way in which continental
judges of the inquisitorial process reacted when confronting
crimes which their culture found horrifying, or very difficult to
prove. Following the then popular maxim "no crime should
remain unpunished"or ne crimina remaneant impunita, they felt
1o For the widely influential German scholarship, see CLAUS RoxIN,
STRAFVERFAHRENSRECHT: EIN STUDIENBUCH 69 (Eduard Kern ed., 24th ed. 1995).
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justified to greatly relax-and sometimes openly transgress-
normal procedural arrangements. 1" But even if international
criminal judges are not prepared to follow this ancient rigime's
example and bend demanding standards of fair procedure for the
sake of obtaining convictions, the fact remains that it is often quite
difficult for them-both morally and politically-to observe these
standards. The refusal to hear an important witness if his identity
is not revealed to the defendant, or the exclusion of some types of
reliable but improperly obtained evidence, is much more troubling
in international than in a typical domestic context-especially if
the ruling could lead to the acquittal of a person responsible for
masterminding a mass atrocity. And since proof sufficiency is in
its practical application less likely to be a fixed entity than a
sliding point along a continuum,12 it may well be that in cases of
such egregious crimes, international criminal judges might
sometimes be actually less scrupulous in applying the beyond a
reasonable doubts standard then they would be in regard to less
serious criminality in the domestic context. 3
IV.
Another reason why some fair procedure standards come under
increased stress in international criminal courts emanates from
their inclination to delve into the surrounding context of crime in
II A testimonial of this attitude is the seventeenth century's statement of the
famous Benedict Carpzov: "it is notorious that in the prosecution of most atrocious
crimes it is permissible to disregard the laws because of their enormity" (notissimum est
quod in delictis atrocissimis propter criminis enormitatem iura transgredi liceat).
Carpzov, supra note 3, pars III, qu. 102, no. 67. On the development of this doctrine
from a text of Pope Innocent IV (1242-1254), see MATHIAS SCHMOECKEL, HUMANITAT
UND STAATSRAISON 276-80 (2000).
12 For doubts that a single proof sufficiency standard is really applied in criminal
cases, see Mirjan R. Damaika, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of
Criminal Procedure, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 506, 542-43 (1973); see generally Larry Landau
& Harry D. Saunders, Re-Thinking the Standard of Proof Seeking Consensus about the
Utilities of Trial Outcomes, INT'L COMMENTARY ON EVIDENCE ISSUEs (2009), available
at http://www.bepress.com/ice/vol7/iss2/art1.
13 A declaration of strict adherence to the standard can be found in ICTY's trial
judgment Prosecutor v. Mrkiid et al., Case No. IT-95-13/1-T, no. 11 (Sept. 27, 2007).
But an empirical study of the Rwanda Tribunal's judgments leaves one with doubts
about the reach of this attitude. See N. A. Combs, Testimonial Deficiencies and
Evidentiary Uncertainties in International Criminal Trials, 14 UCLA J. INT'L L. &
FOREIGN AFF. 235, 264 (2009).
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order to produce a reliable historical record of crime producing
events. This stress is scarcely surprising, considering that an
important source of provisions limiting factual inquiries in
criminal procedure is the concern for the defendant's autonomy,
privacy and dignity. Thus, to use an eloquent example, while the
solicitude for these humanistic values has induced some countries
to ban the evidentiary use of his diary as unfair,14 diary entries of
indicted military or political leaders can obviously be highly
valuable material for judicial historiography. Or, to use another
example, if a defendant were acquitted on the ground of a
reasonable doubt as to his guilt, international criminal judges
might sometimes be prevented from realizing their ambition to
make a record of the underlying atrocity-an atrocity which could
have been sufficiently proven to them in their role as historians.
This is not difficult to understand. While judgments of conviction
are supposed to accurately determine the factual predicates of
liability, judgments of acquittal are not expected to do the same for
factual predicates of innocence: as already noted, they encompass
a wide range of possible states of the world, from clear innocence
and scant evidence of guilt to its substantial probability. And as
juridical and historical pursuits do not use the same cognitive
lenses, the indiscriminate nature of acquittals is alien to
historians. " In sum, then, when the desire of international
criminal judges to portray an atrocity is strong, at least some
standards of fair procedure can appear to them as a frustrating
obstacle.
V.
But the greatest stress on considerations of fairness toward the
14 For the case-law of German courts, see RoxIN, supra note 10, at 168-69.
15 To increase the truth-value of acquittals, at least one more type of judgment
would have to be tucked in between conviction and acquittal. See Mirjan R. Damaika,
Truth in Adjudication, supra note 6. Continental courts of the ancien rigime followed
this logic and used such intermediate judgments. French judges went farthest in this
direction. See BERNARD SCHNAPPER, VOIES NOUVELLES EN HISTOIRE DU DROIT: LA
JUSTICE, LA FAMILLE, LA REPRESSION PtNALE 69, 87 (1991). A judgment of this type
(assolutione per insufficienza delle prove) survived in Italy until 1987, and a jury verdict
of this genre persists to this day in Scotland. While compelling arguments can be made
for intermediate judgments on grounds of epistemic clarity, they are all difficult to
reconcile with the presumption of innocence: the normative force of the presumption
requires judges to close their eyes to actual probabilities of guilt.
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defendant comes from the ennobling ambition of international
criminal tribunals-and especially the permanent International
Criminal Court-to place justice for victims at the heart of their
mission. The stress arises because the desire to safeguard the
interests of the defendant and the desire to protect those of the
victims generate conflicting demands. If contemporary criminal
procedure is to remain tilted in favor of the defendant, can it at the
same time also favor victims? Can it serve two masters, so to
speak?
The tensions produced by the conflicting demands deserve a
closer look. Consider that the more recent demand for
participatory right of victims has arisen in national criminal justice
systems against the background of situations in which crimes
involve a single victim, or only a handful of them. But
international tribunals can easily be driven to cope with the need
to accommodate the demands of thousands, possibly hundreds of
thousands of victims. And even if only their representatives are
entitled to procedural action, the length of proceedings is
inevitably increased-especially if victim representatives take
their role seriously, and do not hesitate to challenge procedural
strategies of other procedural participants. Obviously, then, the
defendant's right to speedy trial can be negatively affected. This
result acquires special poignancy if he is languishing in
preliminary detention-as he usually does in international criminal
proceedings. A related tension has its spring in the fact that he is
faced not only by lawyers from the prosecutor's office but also by
victim representatives. Even if the latter are not formally accorded
the status of parties, the balance of forces between the procedural
contestants is nevertheless affected: the defendant could easily
begin to harbor the feeling that he is engaged in agonistic
confrontation with more than one procedural adversary. The
equality of arms may in this situation become problematic.
Prominent among tensions with defendant's interests is the one
created by the atmosphere of revulsion and anger generated by the
succession of emotional horror stories recounted by agitated
victims. The possible defense versions of events mitigating or
excluding responsibility can in this atmosphere easily be obscured
by burning sympathies for the plight of the victims, and judges
could be driven to attribute to the defendant a larger role in the
incriminated calamities than he actually played. Even the danger
2011] 373
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of scapegoating him should not be ruled out.16
Less visible but important for our purposes is the tension
between the presumption of innocence, on the one hand, and the
early recognition of victimhood by international criminal courts,
on the other. " The tension arises because the presumption-
provided that it is taken seriously-requires more than that the
defendant be assumed innocent until proven guilty: it also
demands that the crime not be taken for granted before the end of
proceedings. This is because the defendant can deny not only his
guilt, but also the commission of crime with which he is charged:
until the prosecutor has satisfied his burden of proof, both crime
and guilt do not exist in the eye of the law. In fact, the conceptual
acrobatics necessary to resolve this tension are an incisive
illustration of the difficulty of mediating between the interests of
victims and the defendant without weakening the traditional liberal
tenets of criminal procedure. It will be said that this difficulty
arises in many national criminal courts as well. Small wonder,
since some demands of the victims' rights movement clash with
liberal procedural arrangements focused on the need to avoid
condemning innocents.18 Good things are not always compatible.
It should be stressed, however, that the difficulties in handling
tensions between the interests of victims and defendants are
weaker in national criminal courts than in international criminal
justice: typical cases they process are not crimes resulting in mass
victimization, and national courts do not place as much weight as
international criminal tribunals on the vindication of victims'
interests.
16 See Claude Jorda & Jerome de Hemptinne, The Status and the Role of the Victim,
in 2 THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 1413
(Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta & John R.W.D. Jones eds., 2002).
17 This is especially the case in the International Criminal Court, whose judges are
authorized to let victims express their "views" and "concerns" at any procedural moment
they find appropriate. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 68, 1 3. Observe also that
victims are admitted to the proceedings of this Court by a preliminary finding that a
crime was committed against them. See Mirjan R. Damagka, The International Criminal
Court between Aspiration and Reality, 14 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 14, 25-26
(2009).
18 Fr6daric Mgret, Beyond "Fairness": Understanding the Determinants of
International Criminal Procedure, 14 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 37, 56 (2009).
See also Salvatore Zappala, The Rights of Victims v. the Rights of the Accused, 8 J. INT'L
CRIM. JUST. 137, 147 (2010).
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Although the strain between the interests of victims and
defendants is usually observed from the defendant's perspective, it
can also come into view from the victims' vantage point. To use
again a previous example, victims of international crimes have
little sympathy for the exclusion of illegally obtained but reliable
evidence. If the illegality is not attributable to them, the exclusion
of evidence seems from their standpoint inapposite-most
obviously if the remaining untainted evidence is insufficient for
conviction. Aside from the absence of closure, why should they
be exposed to the risk of repeated victimization by the actually
guilty who could return to their midst? Again, while this problem
appears in contemporary national criminal courts as well, in
international criminal justice it is much more serious because of
the enormity of international crimes and the multiplicity of victims
they cause.
VI.
Given that the distinctive situation of international criminal
tribunals places the standards of fair procedure under greater stress
than in national systems, the question then becomes whether
something should be done about it. As previously alluded, some
authorities have suggested that the unusual difficulties faced by
international tribunals justify that architects of international
criminal procedure, in determining demands of fairness, focus not
only on the interests of the defendant, but also the interests of
victims, witnesses and prosecutors. On this view, then, balancing
these diverging interests inheres in the notion of a fair trial. 19
Others who have pondered on the issue argue that fairness should
be concerned solely with the proper behavior of public authorities
toward those who are subject to criminal prosecutions. This, they
claim, was the original understanding of American due process, as
well as of fairness as it appeared in national justice systems of
19 See Prosecutor v. Tadi6, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on the Prosecutor's Motion
Requesting Protective Measures for Victims and Witnesses, 27 and 55 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Aug. 10, 1995). The preference for a balancing
approach was also expressed by the German Supreme Court of General Jurisdiction. See
Bundesgerichtshof [BGHSt] [Federal Court of Justice], February 20, 1996,
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESGERICHTSHOFES IN STRAFSACHEN, 42, 49 (Ger.). For the
sympathetic treatment of this view in German scholarship, see RoxIN, supra note 10, at
223.
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continental European countries. Including interests of other
procedural participants in the fairness equation, they maintain,
would take too much of a toll on liberal aspects of criminal
procedure, threatened so recently by overbearing authoritarian
governments.20 Therefore, it would be inappropriate, or at least
questionable, for international criminal tribunals to relax
domestically developed standards of fairness.
Before remarking on this difference of opinion, let us digress
and examine two related questions capable of placing the
importance of the disagreement in better perspective. One
question concerns the possibility of reducing the stress on fairness
toward to the defendant, and the other relates to the importance
international criminal justice should attribute to it.
As suggested at the outset here, international criminal tribunals
aspire to pursue so many goals that even national law enforcement
systems, with their far stronger institutional support and greater
enforcement powers, could buckle under the weight of a
comparable agenda. Might it not be desirable, then, to
disencumber international criminal judges of the burden of some
of the tasks they have assumed? It appears, in fact, that some of
their goals are good candidates for being downplayed, or even
abandoned, since more suitable mechanisms for their realization
exist, or could be created by the community of nations. Probing
into contextual issues transcending concerns with specific crimes
could be entrusted, for example, to truth commissions, or similar
institutions better equipped to deal with the quicksand of history.
These institutions could also provide more opportunity than
criminal procedure for victims to vent their grievances. It is true
that their exalted position in international criminal tribunals is now
celebrated on ideological grounds as a remarkable achievement,
but the pragmatic wisdom of this apotheosis is far from clear.
Leave to one side the just-discussed tensions this attention
generates with the defendant's interests. Other grounds exist for
skepticism about the wisdom of this emphasis. Consider, for
example, that only a few individuals in the likely mass of persons
aggrieved by international crimes can derive meaningful relief
from rights to participate in criminal proceedings. The much
20 See, e.g., Guinadl Mettraux, Foreword, 8 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 75, 76 (2010);
Zappala, supra note 18, at 149; RZEPKA, supra note 4, at 320.
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larger number of those who do not obtain such relief can easily be
harmed again by disappointed expectations of being able to
express their grievances at the trial and obtaining satisfaction in
proceedings. Far more effective to satisfy victims' interests, and
much broader in scope, are sweeping victim compensation
schemes and other forms of restorative justice that could be
established apart from overburdened and inherently weak
international tribunals.2 1 All in all, it appears that the pressures on
fairness toward the defendant would be lessened if international
criminal justice were more modest in its ambitions. But these
pressures would nevertheless remain stronger than in national
jurisdictions, because of the magnitude and complexities of
international crime and the absence of enforcement powers in
international criminal tribunals.
What adds to the frustrating power of these pressures is the
great importance of procedural fairness to international criminal
justice. To realize why this is the case, we must look again at the
objectives of international criminal tribunals. Among them,
deterrence is usually attributed the greatest weight. This choice is
not without tonic irony, however, because it implies that an
objective is treated as most important whose attainment depends
entirely on the benevolence of outside actors. Does it make sense
for the powerless to embrace an objective as being of prime
importance to him although its realization requires the credible
threat or regular exercise of power? Is his choice not a recipe for
disappointment? Since international criminal tribunals are
intrinsically almost impotent, it thus would seems more
appropriate for them to rely on suasion rather than on threats.
They should aspire first and foremost to be moral teachers, and
accord pride of place to the socio-pedagogic function that is so
often mentioned among the goals of international criminal justice.
What does this function entail? It entails attempting to strengthen
the sense of accountability for human rights violations through the
exposure and stigmatization in criminal judgments of the basic
inhumanity of those who are most responsible for mass atrocities.
Recognition of their basic inhumanity leads to the spreading of
empathy, and the spreading of empathy is joined by many fine
21 For a fuller argument along these lines, see Mirjan R. Damalka, What is the
Point ofInternational Criminal Justice?, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 329, 340-43 (2008).
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threads with the spreading of human rights. What we must
observe at this point, however, is the connection between the
socio-pedagogic function so understood and the importance of
fairness to international criminal justice. If international judges
are to be successful in delivering their moral messages, they must
be trusted by their audiences as legitimate authority and be
perceived by them as fair.22
In the end, then, fairness is of great importance to international
criminal tribunals because it is the sine qua non for the successful
cultivation of a goal which is, or should be, at the heart of their
vocation.
VII.
We can now return to the differences of opinion about fairness
demands in international criminal justice. Should the special
difficulties facing international criminal tribunals justify adopting
a sui generis notion of fairness, whose range of applicability
would not be limited to the defendants but extend to other
procedural participants as well? There is no doubt that procedural
participants, other than the defendant, can claim that their interests
have been disregarded without just cause. In a sense, then, they
too could raise the issue of being treated unfairly. But this is not
the concept of fairness which the architects of international
criminal tribunals had in mind in proclaiming the duty of these
tribunals to abide by the standards of fair procedure. When the
International Criminal Court for Former Yugoslavia was being
established, for example, the U.N. Secretary General declared that
it was "axiomatic that the International Tribunal must fully respect
internationally recognized standards regarding the rights of the
accused at all stages of its proceedings." 23 The unspoken
assumption that only the rights of the defendant fit under the
umbrella of fairness when it is invoked in criminal procedure is
clearly expressed in international human rights documents: in
speaking of the rights to "fair trial" they all enumerate only rights
22 Id. at 345-47.
23 U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph
2 of the Security Council Resolution 808, 106, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993)
(emphasis added).
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belonging to persons charged with criminal offenses.24 There is no
hint in these documents that these rights could be "balanced away"
by recognizing the interests of other procedural protagonists. But
this narrow scope of fairness follows also from the didactic
function of international criminal tribunals. Victimized
communities don't need condemnatory judgments to provoke
revulsion to international crimes in their midst. It is communities
sympathetic to the defendant that need to be stirred toward this
sentiment: they should be the target of moral messages. And
unless the carriers of these messages are perceived as being fair to
the defendant, messages are likely to fall on deaf ears.
But if the standards of fairness in international criminal justice
relate solely to defendants, this does not mean that they cannot be
fashioned in ways that depart from those accepted by national
criminal courts. Nor does it mean that these departures cannot be
motivated, inter alia, by concern for the special position of
victims, or even the special difficulties faced by prosecutors in the
environment of international criminal justice. Much as national
standards of fairness are fashioned with an eye to domestic
procedural ecology, fairness in the fledgling international criminal
tribunals may legitimately be molded against the background of
their specific environment. It is an illusion to believe that the
decision of what is fair in the administration of criminal law is
made in monastic isolation from the animating need of justice
systems to combat crime. Attempts at such a splendid detachment
are extremely rare even in liberal countries where individual
values are regarded as paramount and limitations of official power
are greatly pronounced. If procedural law goes too far in
inhibiting the need to control crime, history teaches us that its
provisions tend to be disregarded, or, in an alternative scenario, to
be supplemented with vague substantive law doctrines capable of
24 See, e.g., Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, art. 6, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221; International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, art. 14, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. Note, parenthetically, that the
very expression "fair trial" reveals the Anglo-American provenience of the idea of
fairness. Continental European lawyers would speak of fair procedure rather than of a
fair trial. And they also have no exact translation of the adjective "fair" in their
languages. So the French decided to use the term "procks 6quitable," although it misses
some connotations of "fairness," while the Germans simply adopted the English term
"fair."
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satisfying the repressed need.25 In short, some departures by
international criminal tribunals from domestic standards of
fairness can be justified, given their sui generis goals, the
complexity and the atrocity of crimes they process, and the innate
weaknesses of these tribunals. And while it is true that only the
defendant has the right to fair trial, the determination of what this
right entails does not exclude consideration of the needs generated
by the distinctive environment of international criminal justice,
including consideration of the interest of other procedural
participants affected by this environment.
What are we to make, then, of the previously mentioned
concern that some domestically guaranteed rights of the defendant
might unduly be limited if special problems of international
criminal tribunals were taken into account? 26 For starters, it is
important to realize that attention to these special problems does
not require departures from the basic demands on fair trials as they
are enumerated in principal human rights instruments. 2 In
describing the ingredients of fair trial, all of them use broad terms
that leave room for fine-grained adaptations of these ingredients to
the varying circumstances in which domestic and international
25 A mild symptom of international criminal tribunals' tendency to bypass
evidentiary difficulties by using broad doctrines of substantive criminal law was the
adoption by ad hoc tribunals for former Yugoslavia and Rwanda of a variant of
command responsibility doctrine. Since proof of a commander's knowledge about the
criminal intentions of his underlings turned difficult, his negligent disregard to acquire
this knowledge was made sufficient for criminal responsibility. See Damagka, supra
note 21, at 350, 353.
26 On this concern, see, e.g., Sara Stapleton, Note, Ensuring a Fair Trial in the
International Criminal Court, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 535, 580-608 (1999). In an
insightful article, Fr~dric M6gret seems to share this concern, although his views on the
matter are not entirely clear. Although he expresses the belief that the invocation of
special difficulties faced by international courts represents a serious threat to the idea of
fair trial, he also says that some rights of the defendant may for good reasons be limited
"to account [for] the imperatives of [international] criminal justice." Mdgrit, supra note
18, at 60. And he also writes that the "due process" for international criminal courts
should be approached as a matter of "re-interrogating the tradition of due process in light
of the particular exigencies of international criminal justice." Id. at 76.
27 They include, inter alia, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
G.A. Res. 2200A [XX1], 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
213 U.N.T.S. 221, E.T.S. 5, and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1.
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courts operate. As is amply illustrated by the "margin of
appreciation" left to member states of the Council of Europe by
the European Court of Human Rights, a wide range of more or less
liberal procedural arrangements is compatible-even in the
context of domestic administration of justice-with fair trial
standards. This then holds a fortiori for international criminal
procedure which need not necessarily echo the decisions of the
Strasbourg Court.
The problem with departures by international criminal
tribunals from domestic fair trial arrangements is therefore not
whether they are in principle permissible, but whether they go
beyond minimal requirements of internationally recognized fair
trial demands. Determining this lower limit of the permissible
range of fair arrangements in international criminal justice thus
assumes great importance. If the ability of international criminal
tribunals to punish the worst human rights abusers required that
this lower limit be exceeded, this would rightly provoke a deep
malaise, not only in the circle of human rights activists, but also
beyond. The continued existence of international criminal
tribunals would come under a cloud.
VIII.
While the importance of minimal fairness in international
criminal justice may thus be clear, identifying its requirements is a
difficult task, bound to provoke serious disagreements. There is
hardly anything that can be said on the subject without extensive
argumentation. Before closing, then, no more can be offered here
than a small sample of procedural arrangements that might be
considered fair enough, although they fall below the demands of
most generous extrapolations from basic human rights found in
international instruments and national jurisdictions. And since
little can be said on this theme as if securely clothed in certainty,
the remarks that follow should not be taken as more than tentative
suggestions and provisional markers.
The first example concerns the issue of defendant's self-
representation. As is well known, countries in the Anglo-
American and continental European legal tradition take different
approaches toward this issue. While the former recognize self-
representation as a right, the latter typically insist on mandatory
representation in the prosecution of serious crime. Drafted under
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Anglo-American influence, several international human rights
documents also treat self-representation as a defendant's right, and
so do the founding documents of most international criminal
tribunals. Yet the right to self-representation is never absolute: not
only can it be forfeited, but it is seldom exercised without some
sort of legal assistance in support of the hypothesis of innocence.2 8
What attitude should international justice take toward this right? It
cannot be denied, of course, because denial would run afoul of the
just-mentioned human rights instruments. Two reasons can be
advanced, however, that militate in favor of relaxing the existing
criteria for its forfeiture. One reason is the tension between self-
representation and another fair trial demand, effective defense:
given the complexity of processing international crimes,
defendants cannot be expected to successfully mount their own
cases without professional help.29 The other reason is linked to the
didactic mission of international criminal justice. The pro se
defense, especially one by a charismatic defendant, can turn the
trial into a stage for the promotion of causes harmful to human
rights, so that the intended educational effect of international
criminal trials could easily be lost. It will be said, in opposition,
that the resulting ease in imposing counsel on the unwilling
defendant amounts to obtrusive paternalism. But while this is
powerful criticism in liberal ideology, it is not a decisive or self-
sealing argument for the demiurges of international criminal
justice: they must be responsive to great ideological and cultural
diversity. The conflict with liberal conceptions of human
autonomy-as distinct from complete insensitivity to its claims-
is therefore not a sufficient reason to banish a procedural
arrangement from the array of those that can be regarded as
minimally fair. If Anglo-American political and legal culture were
not so influential in the drafting of human rights documents, even
the outright denial of self-representation in the processing of
serious crime could hardly be treated as fundamentally unfair.30
28 For details, see J. TEMMINCK TuIsTRA, DEFENCE COUNSEL IN INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAw 249-59 (2009).
29 Tensions which can arise among constitutive elements of fair trials cannot be
sketched out here. The bare bones of an argument on this subject would inevitably
become bones of contention because, for lack of space, they could not be clothed with
the flesh of sufficiently extensive discussion.
30 Observe that in judicially directed trials it is easier for the courts to deny self-
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Another illustration of arrangements that could pass muster as
minimally fair relates to the limits of the defendant's right to
confront and cross-examine witnesses. In determining these limits
one of the thorniest issues is that of anonymous witnesses. It is
beyond dispute that the defendant's capacity to challenge the
testimony of witnesses against him is greatly restricted if he is
unfamiliar with their identity. But it is equally clear that cases
arise in which important and potentially trustworthy witnesses
refuse to testify, unless assured that their identity is not disclosed
to the defendant. In glancing at national systems of criminal
justice, it is interesting to note that few of them reject anonymous
witness testimony out of hand. Most of them allow the use of
anonymous testimony as a means of last resort in some
circumstances, provided that anonymity is the only available
measure to protect the witness." For countries belonging to the
Council of Europe, the Strasbourg Court approved this flexible
attitude, refusing to hold that the use of anonymous testimony
violates the defendant's human rights in all circumstances. 32What
should be the approach of international criminal tribunals toward
this sensitive issue? One must bear in mind that the need for
anonymous testimony arises not only more frequently in
international than in national criminal law enforcement, but that
the rejection of this testimony is also much more troubling in the
international environment. Not only because of the magnitude of
crimes in the jurisdiction of international criminal tribunals and
the resulting strong punitive demands, but also because of the
greater ease of hatching witness intimidation schemes in the
representation rights without creating the impression of trying to muzzle the defendant:
since he is entrusted with fewer means to influence the course of procedural action than
in party orchestrated trials, less is taken away from him than in systems where he can
organize his own case.
31 Some American jurisdictions may be exceptional in this regard. For a
comparative survey, see STEFAN TRECHSEL, HUMAN RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
318-20 (2005).
32 But the Court has held that anonymous testimony always violates this right if it
constitutes "the sole or decisive" evidence against him. For an insightful discussion of
the Court's case law, see KAROLY BARD, FAIRNESS IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 234-48
(2008). Surprisingly, the English Court of Appeals has recently disregarded this law by
ruling that trials could be fair even where anonymous testimony is the "sole of decisive"
evidence implicating the defendant. See In R v. Mayers, [2008] EWCA Crim. 2989, at
23, [2009] 1 WLR 1915 at 23.
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international arena, and the greater difficulty of international
prosecutors to obtain alternative evidence.33 Considering, now,
that anonymous testimony is per se not regarded as incompatible
with domestic conceptions of fair trials - even by human rights
forums - it becomes difficult to argue that international criminal
tribunals should take a stricter position on this matter. What
remains as a difficult and sensitive problem, however, is to
properly determine the specific conditions that must be met in
order to admit anonymous witnesses. Should, for example, one of
these conditions be serious personal danger to the witness himself,
or could serious personal danger to people close to him also
qualify? Equally difficult is to devise appropriate measures to
compensate for the reduced ability of the defense to test their
testimony. One measure to contemplate in this regard would be to
let the tribunal entrust an ad hoc procedural participant with the
inquiry into the background, possible motive for bias, and
potential cognitive weaknesses of anonymous witnesses.3 4
The treatment of credible but illegally obtained evidence is yet
another sensitive subject in considering minimal fairness of
international criminal justice." To place the subject in proper
perspective, it is useful again to begin by looking at national
systems of criminal procedure. Some are very strict, demanding
that improperly obtained evidence be automatically rejected, no
matter how important and reliable it might be, and also that
whatever derives from this tainted source be excluded from
trials.36 But the great majority of national criminal procedures do
33 The need to use anonymous testimony was invoked already in the first case tried
by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. The issue led to a
split court decision. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, ICTY Case No. IT-94-1-T, Decision on the
Prosecutor's Motion Requesting Protective Measures for Victims and Witnesses (August
10, 1995).
34 See SALVATORE ZAPPALA, HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS 132 (2003).
35 For the tendency to exaggerate the likelihood that illegally obtained evidence is
also unreliable, see infra note 40.
36 An example of this strict legal regime on the European Continent can be found in
Greece, especially with regard to evidence obtained in violation of personal privacy. See
Dimitrios Giannoulopoulos, The Exclusion of Improperly Obtained Evidence in Greece,
11 INT'L J. EVIDENCE & PROOF 181-210 (2007). Whether Greek (and some other) courts
always follow this approach in processing most serious crimes would be worth
exploring.
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not go so far: they authorize judges to weigh the seriousness of the
crime on trial against the seriousness of the right violated in
acquiring evidence. 3 Since the European Human Rights
Convention contains no provision on the subject, the Strasbourg
Court left it to the states to decide how to treat the issue, leaving
them again a sizable "margin of appreciation."3 8
The attitude of international criminal courts on this subject is
still evolving, but an idea of how this genre of evidence is
presently treated may be gained from the case law of the Yugoslav
War Crimes Tribunal.39 If judges find that an item of evidence
was obtained by prosecutors or investigators of the Tribunal
through oppressive interrogation techniques, or in breach of some
other rule regarding proper interrogation, they tend to reject that
item automatically. But whether this strict attitude is attributable
solely to perceptions of unfairness is not clear: the belief that
evidence obtained in this manner is unreliable also seems
instrumental.40 On the other hand, evidence obtained through
illegal intercepts, secret monitoring, or illegal searches and
seizures, tends to be admitted without much visible agonizing
about possible interference with privacy values.4 1 Several reasons
explain this contrasting approach. It is not only that this type of
spuriously acquired evidence-provided it is authentic-tends to
37 For a sample of decisions in countries following this approach, see STEPHEN C.
THAMAN, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 105-18 (2002); see also Gerson Trtig &
Jrg Habetha, Beweisverwertung trotz rechswidriger Beweisgewinung, 28 NEUE
ZEITSCHRIFT FUR STRAFRECHT 481-92 (2008).
38 But if the wrongfully acquired evidentiary material was used in deciding a case,
the Court views this circumstance as one of the indicia suggesting that criminal
proceedings "as a whole" were unfair. See, e.g., Schenk v. Switzerland, 140 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) at 40 (1988).
39 For a meticulous study, see Sabine Swoboda, Admitting Relevant and Reliable
Evidence, in ICTY: TOWARDS A FAIR TRIAL? 365-92 (T. Kruessmann ed., 2008).
40 This is not necessarily true, however; oppressive interrogations can yield
accurate information. Many of those who argue differently do so in a well-meaning
attempt to psychologically condition criminal law enforcement officials. The latter are
thought more amenable to arguments concerning prevention of factual error than they are
to arguments extolling the primacy of the individual, human dignity and similar
humanistic values.
41 For an example of the difficulty experienced by international criminal courts to
exclude credible, but illegally obtained evidence, see Prosecutor v. Brdjanin, Case No.
IT-99-36-T, Decision on the Defense Objection to Intercept Evidence, T 61 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 3, 2003).
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be reliable and often conclusive. It is also true that this type of
evidence is usually obtained by governmental agencies pursuing
goals independent of international criminal prosecutions. Starved
as they are for evidence, international criminal tribunals find it
difficult to reject the fruits of these activities if their wrongful
character cannot be attributed to their own officials. If they reject
these fruits, could this not be interpreted as a rebuke to
governments on whose good will for cooperation they vitally
depend? And if rejection were the adopted policy, then
governments implicated in international crimes and pressured to
cooperate with international justice might be tempted to stage
improper acquisition of evidence in order to prevent its
employment against their leaders.
Adopting a variant of the flexible approach to reliable but
illegally obtained evidence thus seems the right way to go for
international criminal tribunals. It is difficult to criticize it as
unfair to defendants, given again that it is considered fair enough
in environments where the need for evidence is much less
pronounced and where paradigmatic crimes are typically of much
lesser gravity. But the flexible approach also accords with the
perceptions of fairness in broad swaths of the tribunals'
constituency. The idea that the criminal defendant has a fairness-
based claim to the automatic rejection of all illegally obtained
evidence does not agree with ordinary perception of justice.
Ordinary people tend to believe that such evidence should be used,
at least in prosecutions of serious crime, and that the appropriate
reaction to the wrongful manner of acquisition is to punish those
responsible for it. Even if a few exclusionary rules of this genre
encounter a measure of sympathy, stretching them to their full
logical potential is not likely to be met with approval. On the
contrary, the results of such a logical expansion are likely to be
dismissed as misbegotten subtleties, engendered by a single-
minded focus of the legal mind on isolated aspects of criminal
justice. If international criminal tribunals are to fulfill their
didactic mission, they should avoid the perception of cloistered
isolation from the intuitions of ordinary people. In the end, then, it
seems best for international criminal judges to take recourse to the
rejection of reliable but illegal evidence only in those cases where
the manner of its acquisition is truly outrageous. Limited in this
way, the loss of evidence would have a good chance to be
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understood and accepted even in the prosecution of genocidal
saturnalia, where the impulse to condemn and punish is at its
apogee.
Similar analysis could be undertaken for a variety of other
procedural arrangements.4 2 Yet, we shall not continue on this path
here. What we have said so far should suffice to support the view
that ideas on what is fair to the criminal defendant are not fixed, or
independent from the environment in which criminal courts
operate and from the objectives they seek to attain. Requirements
of fairness developed against the background of domestic criminal
law enforcement should therefore not unreflectively be projected
into the arena of international criminal justice. All of which is not
to say that there are no limits to the adaptation of fairness demands
to specific contexts. In all the permutations to which these
demands can be subjected, an elusive core minimum, or kernel,
cannot be disregarded without compromising the hard-won
achievements of civilization. The reputation of international
criminal justice depends on respecting this kernel and leaving it
intact. Sporadic acquittals of the probably guilty that may result
from this respect should not be regarded as a failure. In order to
preserve their moral muscle, international criminal tribunals must
maintain a degree of suspense in regard to the final outcome. If
the perception were to spread that they stack the deck against the
defendant, or that their proceedings are programmed to lead to
convictions, their legitimacy in the eyes of their audiences would
be doomed.
42 Most controversial is the search for minimal requirements of the privilege
against self-incrimination. Note that the Strasbourg Court has ruled that even the
defendant's right to silence is not without some qualifications. See John Murray v. The
United Kingdom, 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 48-53 (1996).
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